This is clearly allied with Prigogine's notion of 'dissipative structures'. Its paradox can be resolved by an 'ecological' perspective: a self-organizing system in an environment of self-organizing systems is reciprocal in terms of cause and effect. Put simply, it has to be viable; and at other times it may not be viable. Morin (2002) offers auto-eco-organization, a significant development with which we concur. We stress that 'reciprocal' causality does not imply that the temporal order of causes and effects can be 'loosened'.
The fourth theme argues that knowledge, representation, information, cognitions of any kind, are material consequences of this same ecology. Cognition is not therefore 'determined'. This does not imply a return to any kind of base/superstructure model, whether representational, correspondential or 'economic'. Rather, it is to say that cognition is self-organizing or auto-referential; and that this occurs within a material and informational ecology. As Morin puts it:
[Just] as auto-organisation is in fact auto-eco-organisation, self or auto reference is really auto-exo-reference, which is to say that to refer to oneself one must refer to the outside world. (2002: 49) Unlike 'representationalism' -the idea that the world 'provides' information 'to be processed' -we argue, that auto-organization and informational imperatives are mutually attracted. Both are evolved, system or organismspecific phenomena.
Complexity and Ecology
The idea that phenomena are contingent, conventional, 'could have been otherwise', is old and widespread in the study of human culture and often taken as the indicator of 'criticalness' -though its specific forms are diverse. It is formulated by Kant in his dictum: 'Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so but not that it cannot be otherwise.' More recently, Foucault's post-structuralism advises that:
as a semiotics of materiality. It takes the semiotic insight, that of the relationality of entities, the notion that they are produced in relations, and this applies ruthlessly to all materials and not simply to those that are linguistic. This suggests: first, that it shares something important with Michel Foucault's work; second that it may usefully distinguished from those versions of poststructuralism that attend to language and to language alone. (1999: 3-4) Is the 'semiotics of materiality' a reductive expression or the declaration of an intention to confront qualitatively different phenomena? The matter remains equivocal; and crucially, for us, in transition. Instead of a semiotics of materiality we prefer the notion of an ecology that includes the possibility of the semiotic, however much we as humans might put that first 'in practice'. That statement itself turns on a further assumption that is generally 'granted' but not made explicit: the priority of a general ontology of auto-eco-organization. So, by 'contingent' do we mean random -and so could have been otherwise? Or do we mean 'contingent upon', which connotes a very different set of conditions, causes, even quite tight limits. Similarly, it is acknowledged that chaos and self-organization are interconnected but finally opposing principles: chaos is in part superseded in selforganization. But the idea that chaos and self-organization limit each other, we think, is under-explored. The challenge of exploring the relationship consists in the former being formally designated, while the latter demands qualitative inquiry. Another way to approach this is to reconsider the fundamental difference of systems theory: the making of a structural distinction between system and environment. Our preference for a 'general' ecology also suggests that similarly structural differences are of the utmost importance to any auto-organizational or constructivist epistemology. Just as in the evolutionary processes of speciation, a degree of physical separation is necessary to 'perform' that difference, so a degree of structural separation is central to social construction. Clearly, the social barriers, fissures, folds (or whatever one wants to call them) are of a different kind -stratification, technology, political forms and so on -yet the structural requirement is parallel: one cannot speak of a constituted culture based on class, gender, nationality, episteme, religion, without granting that the structure of separation, while mediated, is necessary to the processes of constitution. It is hard to see how an orientation sometimes called 'post-structuralism' can claim to recognize this requirement. Is then the 'semiotics of materiality' the promise of a heterology or homology attending, if not to language alone, then still granting its traditional philosophical primacy?
The work of , Cohen and Stewart (1995) and Hayles (1991 Hayles ( , 1999 reveals part-superseded chaos or patterns and structures: bifurcations, attractors, far-from-equilibrium systems, chemical clocks, autopoiesis, living systems, ecologies, evolution and so on. Their persistence -their embeddedness in the order of things -ought, perhaps, to be more often contrasted with the simpler formulation: 'could have been otherwise' that we noted above. The choice of 'evolution' here is also deliberate. Complexity's relation to Darwinism jars with humanist sociology's propensity to see humans, and human culture, as both distinct and due to human inventiveness, not subject, or less subject, to material, factual or natural limitations.
Prigiogine's work, by contrast, suggest that it is possible to consider an ontology of complex self-organization combined, contrasted or commensurate with contingency in a continuum that includes chemical, biological and human organizations. This does not propose a 'reductivism' in the study of human structures so much as re-energize the relationships between order, contingency and chaos. Prigogine describes the impact of external energy flowing into systems, drawing them far from equilibrium. Crucially, he is dealing with populations within systems, as opposed to single particles. None of this work applies to individual particles; it is difficult to say that such things exist, rather like 'individual' humans. Equally important are his modifications to the principle of entropy. This states that systems tend toward thermal equilibrium. It is important to see what equilibrium means here: in essence all that can happen has happened. Previously differentiated components have homogenized, become 'equilibrated'. This is the most probable state. The system is no longer 'driven'. A simple example is a cup of coffee: it is easy to predict its state, say, two hours from now. However, shortly after making it, we cannot be sure of the effective temperature. Put simply, at that stage you'd sip not gulp. After a while that would not matter: entropy is both a theoretic and a practical matter. But there is a major contradiction. If the entropic principle is universal, how, given the age of the universe, are reactions still going on? Even more improbable is the evolution of complex molecules necessary for life. Yet, plants resist entropic decline by synthesizing energy directly from sunlight to re-create their structures and processes. Most other living things excrete entropy by consuming the energy of other living (or once-living) things.
Here, Prigogine's thinking 1 (Porush, 1991: 56) What this indicates is that the process is driven by 'available energy', is itself 'structural' and completely without moral motivation or judgement. It is autoeco-organizational. Another major issue for Prigogine is irreversibility:
Dissipative systems are thermodynamically open. They are capable of assimilating large reserves of environmental energy and converting them into increasing structural complexity. The process . . . is irreversible . . . the system cannot return to its original state. Because of this irreversible increase in internal complexity, dissipative systems possess an evolutionary capacity which allows them to fend off thermal equilibrium.
[Therefore] . . . scientists refer to the ability of dissipative systems to transfer their positive entropy (i.e. the build up of internally generated disorder) to their immediate surroundings at a faster rate than they produced them. . . . Hence the name 'dissipative structures '. (Reed and Harvey, 1992: 362) Near-to-equilibrium systems 'forget' initial conditions, which can simply be translated as 'perturbations' because the tendency to stability is greater. In far-from-equilibrium systems, the energy for change exceeds the tendency to stability, but new forms of more complex structural organization may appear. We might say that re-organizations 'cope' with the excess energy better. At this level the ideas seem quite simple: things will tend toward equilibrium unless more energy is supplied; then more complex 'equilibria' or organizations will 'evolve'. In a sense, the matter is that simple. The consequences, however, are anything but simple. This is a crucial characteristic of complexity theory, especially in relation to self-organization. If at least some of the basic process of self-organization were not simple, it is difficult to explain how self-organized complexity arises, how evolution begins at all.
Prigogine constantly stresses interaction, especially within far-fromequilibrium phenomena:
Near-equilibrium laws are universal, but when they are far from equilibrium, they become mechanism dependent. We therefore have to perceive the origin of variety in nature we observe around us. Matter acquires new properties when far from equilibrium in that fluctuations and instabilities become the norm. Matter becomes more 'active'. (Prigogine, with Stengers, 1997: 64, emphasis added) This passage cannot describe randomness. Irreversible time, coupled with specific energies instead describes a rooted 'tree' of possibilities. Prigogine insists that 'time' is a real and active dimension of being and equally requires a determinate or 'strong' notion of matter. This is often glossed in sociologists' comments on far-from-equilibrium systems. Sociology tends to emphasize their capacity to evolve in unpredictable ways. The perspectives of neo-Darwinism, though -or probably because -they place less emphasis on dissipative systems, show instead that evolution is not possible without species. 'Species' here corresponds with 'strong matter'. It further implies a deep connection between simpler, more stable components and their 'characteristic' interactive behaviours in systems far from equilibrium. To apply Prigogine's models to sociology, we argue, an equally 'strong' version of component systems (particularly the evolution of the human mind) is necessary to successfully ground and energize further-from-equilibrium phenomena such as economies, technologies, social evolution. The ontological stance that asserts 'things could have been otherwise' is not even close to this requirement.
The emergence of complexity from energized interaction is completely incompatible with randomness, conventionality or 'maximized' human plasticity. Maximized human plasticity is instead a contradiction: human conduct, including culture, is subject to attractors that reflect human requirements. Much the same contradiction is recognized by actor-network theory (Law, 1999: 5) . Included here is the requirement that the actions of one group impinging on the interests of another generate the risk of conflict. This is not a reductive move; on the contrary it promotes difference. At the simplest level, even the occupation of a certain location (spatial, temporal, economic, cultural, etc.) has a direct bearing on the probability (possibility and impossibility) of another's ability to occupy the same place. A variety of 'ecological' disciplines follow implicitly or explicitly from this recognition: population dynamics, economics, the study of cultural process, etc. Perhaps the most famous, in sociology is the concept of organic solidarity. Following the concept of 'evolution' without the ancient sentiment of human superiority, we should instead think in terms of path-dependency. This is not simple determinism: paths can take new directions; they also have a distinctive past, for good or ill; and they can overlap, network, flow or collide. But this and other topological figures remain structured spaces.
146 Theory, Culture & Society 22(5) This means that non-linear unpredictability, such as Gray (2002 Gray ( , 2003 or Urry (2003) indicate, is the necessary outcome of the energyecology of component interaction. This version of self-organizing ecological complexity is unlike those heterologies that rest on the freedoms of conventional structures to contradict each other. Clearly this is intended analytically: actual writers occupy a spectrum ranging from extreme constructivism, to a preoccupation with power, to multi-disciplinary socioecology. Theorists of both postmodernity and complexity are linked by their fascination with the ontology of the heterogeneous. But the concept of heterology is itself in transition. The more radical constructivisms rest on the overestimation of human construction and authorship; politically, they resemble Rorty's (1989) liberal ironist. If such discordant ontologies as those of Prigogine's material dynamics and humanism's 'authorship' can coexist, it must be on the basis of a more complex theory of demarcation than the routine distinction between natural and social phenomena -as though neither were interactive. Similarly, Urry notes:
Humans are intricately networked with machines, texts, objects and other technologies. There are no purified social networks, only 'material worlds' that involve peculiar and complex socialities with objects. (2003: 56) This position is not reductive -but an opposition to the reduction indicated by the concepts 'contingent' or 'convention'. Not all human action is conventional; much of it is contingent upon necessities. Even the most unnecessary action may initiate irreversible results. What sense remains in our ostensible authorship of the human world? It loses the distinctions between authorship, power and consequences: it is too simple. Again, the concept is in transition: to concede that human productions may be gathered around important or necessary attractors is not to reduce but to increase complexity and differentiation. Descriptions that include propensity or probability as well as widespread conventionality cannot be charged with reductionism or naïve foundationalism except from the remnants of a 'sociology' of the self-defining.
Ecology and Cognition
It has been established that systems far from equilibrium tend to generate complex structures that are the outcome of interactions between components, energized by thermal flows from their environment. These structures are mechanism-specific; they relate to the materials or components of their composition. Two contrasts then arise:
■
In near-to-equilibrium systems the material components are 'indifferent' to each other. They 'prefer' to obey universal (non-system-specific) laws. In less loaded terms, the universal laws are the more probable influence. This is not the equilibrium demonstrated by organisms: these, as 'open' systems, demonstrate 'achieved' homeodynamic identities through environmental interaction.
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■ Conventionality, in the sense 'could have been otherwise', forbids rank or 'necessity' for interactions and, consequently, also forbids any authentic structural identity. We are then propelled toward a concept of structural identity in social phenomena (however complex) as tending toward, or resting on, chaos.
The task is now to show that system-specific structures evolve toward the potential of also requiring system-specific information. The two main interrelated dimensions are the radicalization of self-organization and the reality of time.
As soon as the system becomes large enough, the law of large numbers enables us to make a clear distinction between mean values and fluctuations, and the latter may be neglected.
and:
However, in nonequilibrium processes we may find just the opposite situation. Fluctuations determine the global outcome. We could say that instead of being corrections in the average values, fluctuations modify those averages. (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984: 178) Notice that the macroscopic dimension remains fundamental. So does thermal energy, as Prigogine reminds us: Ignis mutat res. Surely this allows for reversibility? That becomes increasingly impossible. The law of large numbers allows us to distinguish between the 'significant' mean and the less significant fluctuation. Providing we think in terms of linear dynamics that should allow us to 'run' the system forward and backward, if not literally then analytically. Similarly, there is a strong statistical possibility that a system characterized by linear dynamics can return to a previous state. Consider the case in non-linear dynamics: here the influence of chance, positive feedback and sensitivity to 'initial' conditions provide a complex series of possibilities for different configurations. A number of quite different outcomes are equally possible. So are sudden changes in configuration.
This time, the law of large numbers presents a quite different statistical requirement: that, in order to truly reverse, any system having non-linear dynamic qualities must 'know', 'store' and 'go back through' all of its previous actual positions. Given any degree of chance this is a practical impossibility that grows with the number of interactions. The vivid conclusion is that if true 'reversibility' is asserted, then the storage of (system-specific) 'information' must be presumed. Change the simple dimension of 'reversibility' to its multi-dimensional cognates such as persistent selfreorganization, homeostasis, 'reproduction' or 'autopoiesis' and one can see just how far-reaching this small point is: it indicates the threshold of the living. For the ability to reorganize, reproduce, while at the same time being systems open to environmental energies is especially characteristic of the 148 Theory, Culture & Society 22(5) living. It is also characteristic of phenomena whose organization is mediated by the living, especially the social. We have in root form the common ontology of material organization, information and their evolution. We are also forced to confront the qualitative 'technology' of informational operations: from DNA, to memory, to language, writing, culture and IT. Crucially, a number of these 'technologies' operate below the level of consciousness.
This point runs counter to the assumption of separation between substance and information, hardware and software. The material substrate of information is no longer neutral. From a post-Prigogine viewpoint, we argue, both are system-specific emergent properties. We must also emphasize, then, that what can be described as two 'poles' of genesis are now brought together. One 'pole' clearly active in Prigogine and in Luhmann stresses the emergence of complex orders at 'interfaces': system and environment, particle interaction, processes and by-products, intended and unintended consequences, for example, of cultural reproductions. The other stresses deep and plastic material structures notably in genomes and the like -but especially in the notion that the recombination of structural pattern 'units' results in the enormous diversity of genetic expression in the material world of nature. The same may be said of the combination of elements: hydrogen and oxygen as qualitative components expressed in the quite different qualitative form of water. What we want to stress here is the common ontology of these poles: the unity that grounds or 'propagates' qualitative differentiation. De Landa's (1999) characterization of these common but differentiated structures (from landscapes to culture) as 'slowing down' of time is apt. Whether we speak of 'temporary' -if robust -structures such as a continent, an ecosystem, the human genome or 'capitalism', we find constructions of material, information (both derived and generative) and subsisting entities describable by common 'metaphors' which (following De Landa again) are more than analogues.
Similarly, sociology, confronted by cultural heterogeneity, has not unreasonably concluded that human consciousness has a high degree of plasticity. It is seen as characterized by its own history of self-establishment. This point is both subtle and overwhelming: consciousness is seen as constituted by the history of its formulations, that is, by culture. Its selfconstitutive method is learning. The only limit to learning is itself 'learnt'. Surely we have just described the self-organization of consciousness? From complexity theory within biology and psychology, the answer is no. What has been described is the evolution of the modern contents of human consciousness, a reflection on the history of culture. From the eco-organizational point of view, the story of consciousness begins long before this. The evolution of consciousness and the human brain has been omitted.
Morin tells us:
With the bacterium we have neither a computer nor a machine by itself but both at once in the same thing. We have a being, a machine being that is also a computing being . . .
[that] processes signs and data about its internal and The Cartesian cogito appears much later, as it requires a welldeveloped brain as well as language and culture. (Morin, 2002: 48) And he continues:
There are a thousand ways to prove that one exists. What is interesting here is this ergo: 'I cannot doubt that I am a subject.' But what Descartes did implies the computo. His cogito implies the computo.
[O]ur cogitos, that is, our consciousness as subjects, depend on the fundamental computo, which the billions of our brain cells, in their organisational and creative interactions, incessantly cause to emerge. (Morin, 2002: 55) What we want to emphasize here is that the differentiation we call 'culture' is both robust and yet is grounded in a continuity of enormous significance. The common ground, origin, ontology does not preclude but rather initiates the kind of autofinality connoted by für sich. The Hegelian echo is not accidental; nor, then, is the bringing together of 'poles' of genesis.
Maturana and Varela are also instructive. The story begins with a frog. Briefly, the creature was wired up by planting sensors in its visual cortex but instead of 'corresponding' to stimuli:
. . . fast, erratic motion elicited maximum response whereas large, slow moving objects evoked little or no response. It is easy to see how such perceptual equipment is adaptive . . . because it allows the frog to perceive flies while ignoring other phenomena irrelevant to its interests. The results implied that the frog's perceptual system does not so much register reality as construct it. (Hayles, 1999: 135) And, in addition:
If we think of sense receptors as constituting a boundary between inside and outside, this implies that organizationally, the retina matches up with the inside, not the outside. Maturana concluded that perception is not fundamentally representational . . . to speak of an objectively existing world is misleading, for the very idea of a world implies a world that pre-exists its construction by an observer. Certainly there is something 'out there,' which for want of a better term we can call 'reality.' But it comes into existence for us, and for all living creatures, only through the interaction processes determined solely by the organism's own organisation. (Hayles, 1999: 135) This is where Maturana and Varela part company with the complex, thermodynamically driven systems theory of Prigogine and the more formal 150 Theory, Culture & Society 22 (5) 'general' systems theory of von Bertalanffy (1969) . Where these authors identify organic complexity with open systems, Maturana, Varela and their followers emphasize 'operational closure' and 'structural coupling'. This is what is intended by 'interaction processes determined solely by the organism's own organisation'. In one sense, this is demanded by the shift of register from 'systems' to living organisms: the latter must preserve a distinct operational identity, in the face of its immediate environment, in order to exist at all and certainly for that operational identity to evolve. In a sense, then, 'closure' is more critically founded than 'openness' in respect of the living. However, its implications must be understood. Far from being simply a development over general systems theory warranted by organisms, it is also a critique of evolutionary theory where, traditionally, the notion of adaptation is prioritized. The emphasis on operational closure, however, counters the 'close coupling' implied by adaptation with the principle of sufficiency. Structural coupling, as opposed to adaptation, only requires operational viability, not close correspondence.
The first step is to switch from a prescriptive logic to a proscriptive one, that is, from the idea that what is not allowed is forbidden to the idea that what is not forbidden is allowed. . . . This proscriptive orientation shifts our attention to the tremendous diversity of biological structures at all levels. . . . The second step is to analyse the evolutionary process as satisficing (taking a suboptimal position that is satisfactory) rather then optimising: here selection operates as a broad survival filter that admits any structure that has sufficient integrity to persist. (Varela et al., 1993: 195-6) The crucial point is that we do not retain the notion of an independent, pregiven environment but let it fade into the background in favour of so-called intrinsic factors. (Varela et al., 1993: 198) Yet there remains an equivocation; on the one hand:
[L]iving beings and their environments stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or codetermination . . . on the other:
[E]xtraorganismal environment is made internal by psychological or biochemical assimilation, an internal state is externalised through products and behaviour that select and organise the surrounding world. (Varela et al., 1993: 198-9, emphasis added) The structural comparison with radical-constructivist sociologies is striking. Where the 'tremendous diversity of organisms selects or organizes surrounding worlds' -we can similarly read the diversity of 'culture' as the reflexive selection and organization of knowledge practices about world(s). Yet there remains, for us, the growing import of mutual specification or
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viability. This should be understood in the fundamental sense: viability as vitality; that which permits 'life' (social or not) to continue. This is where 'structural coupling' glosses some serious matters.
On first inspection there seems to be a close parallel between the 'constructivisms' of Maturana and Varela -where organisms 'bring forth worlds' -with those of constructivist sociology, resulting in a similar ethical heterology. Wolfe (1998) offers a powerful analysis of these relationships in a discussion that clearly links Deleuze and Foucault with Bateson, Maturana, Varela and Luhmann. However, we argue: ■ It makes sense to argue that the 'frog's perceptual system does not so much register reality as construct it' but the risk in that limitation -which follows from the necessity that systems are less complex than their environments, remains unstressed. Does the frog 'construct' its prey or an unseen, predator, a heron perhaps? And yet the frog precisely reconstructs itself within extremely tight, complex and interactive limits. Such specification necessarily preceded the frog's possibility.
■
What is indicated here is a massively parallel series of considerations in which tight specifications, coarse approximations, construction of worlds and construction by worlds, 'actual' correspondences and cognitive reconstructions inform and interact with each other.
Stated from a post-Prigogine point of view, two emphases must be made. First, that 'recursive causality' -a characteristic of complexity, implied in 'bringing forth worlds' -still has a temporal direction, which makes that particular expression questionable. The same may be said of 'constructivism'. Second, the ordinary definition of contingency is also reconstructed by the influence of structures (ecologically) organized in time. The frog's contingency is much more strictly limited than the human's; than the human's served by advanced technology. After Prigogine, contingency cannot be treated as a formal principle: it becomes a qualitative dimension.
Contingency in the formal sense and self-organization exhibit countertendencies. One cannot have self-organization unless the self is, in some sense, specified previous to its processes of reproduction. And the information that codes the specification is intrinsic to the organization of the phenomenon. It is not carried in a neutral substrate. ■ Therefore, when Wolf says that 'second-order cybernetics . . . must always accompany the assertion of the contingency of the observer [with] the fact that an observation could always be otherwise' -we must dissent somewhat.
The term 'somewhat' should be taken most seriously. Two quite different models of complexity restate themselves here. One model depends on what might be called 'symmetrical' or formal contingency. It tends to overlook the fact that extremely precise, mandatory and very loose, partial informational requirements are necessarily active, 'in parallel' at the same time.
152 Theory, Culture & Society 22(5) The second stresses both parallelism and ecological limitation through what might be called the history, even the fate of contingency in its terrestrial realization. This could be less dramatically expressed, again, by 'path-dependency'. The question we want to pursue is whether our current perception of extreme mental plasticity and its associated ability to construct worlds is more or less viable than a concept of an adapted human mind with more limited post-natal plasticity. This is the dilemma embedded in auto-exo-reference. The limitations -though counter to a radical heterology -are not politically perverse. They would, rather, 'grow out of' the parallel needs for precise and 'loose' information and the complex topology of what hitherto has been formally and over-simply addressed as contingency. Or: self-organization does not take place against a general background of contingency; rather, chaos and self-organization determine each other somewhat in the form of degrees or 'landscapes' of possibility or impossibility.
Ecology, Complexity and Culture
Prigogine's descriptions primarily occur at small macro-scales. Yet ecology as a general context, and the ecology of human societies in particular, take place at fundamentally large macro-scales. His analyses, then, remain analogical. His interactions between particles lack the dimension of interaction between qualitatively different systems. Therefore when Hayles (1999: 192) 
notes:
One contemporary belief likely to stupefy future generations is the postmodern orthodoxy that the body is primarily, if not entirely, a linguistic construction . . . he points to a further dimension, the tendency to simplify, if not elide, systems: the body, as system, can be treated as a linguistic system. Complexity theory might be seen as the necessary counter to this strategy. We cannot dispute the importance of language in human culture but many other attractors are also at work. Culture itself seems to need or generate differential attractors internally, while attractors such as climate, landscape, the availability of water, are 'external' attractors of cultural types. However, whatever culture 'wants' or environment 'imposes' the result is interaction: an ecology in which certain features are more possible than others; a topology of possibility and impossibility. Viability becomes an essential issue. This point is often unexamined in sociology in general:
. . . [social construction is] conceptualised for the most part, in terms of practices, projects and processes that operate unproblematically. (Malpas and Wickham, 1995: 38, quoted in Urry, 2003: 14) The result is a conception of failure or malfunction as the exception, the unintended consequence, the result of unforeseen contingencies, whereas:
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The use of complexity should enable us to break with such dualistic thinking, of system and its failures. Chaos and order are always interconnected within any such system. (Urry, 2003: 14) Durkheim claimed the specificity of sociology on the grounds that social phenomena are sui generic. After the 'complexity turn' it appears that sociology may instead be a specialist branch of a general ontology of ecoauto-organization. This has enormous bearing on the ethical responsibilities of sociology itself. Where social construction through language is stressed, the ethical outcome is the demand for pluralism since there is no reasonable cause for constraint. The rise of fundamentalism showed us how narrow that view was: pluralism is easily recognized by others as prescriptive. Now there is the combined effect of global warming, the shortage of water and the depletion of fossil fuels. Is the sociology of pluralism appropriate here or are we faced with different kinds of ethical choices? Has sociology rediscovered imperatives? Imperatives will not square with sui generic social phenomena, however, unless we agree that 'they' generate their own limits -by which we clearly mean ecological viability. Sui generic phenomena suddenly look like everything else that is auto-eco-organizational. Their previously separated status seems to rest in our view on the ability to construct 'without reference to'. In what ways does complexity theory differ from this? The answer again lies with Prigogine. Complexity cannot arise from individual particles or even, in this case, from a class of phenomena that can operate 'without reference to'. The requirements are large-scale macroscopic interactions in which all parties are 'real' contributors; crucially, chance is only one of those contributors. Only on this basis is 'the complexity turn' properly grounded. Otherwise it is a needless elaboration. Another way to say this is that complexity theory becomes necessary only when 'eco' is added to auto-organization.
Complexity's counter-concept is an 'attractor', which may be understood as a recognizable but fluid or fuzzy space with roots in the ecology of self-organization. 'Visual culture' is one example; 'old age' is another quite different one. Some attractors exhibit different degrees of fluidity, rigidity, 'brittleness' or capacity for radical transformation. These characteristics do not permit linear expectations to be realized. That situation is complicated by their interaction and by the limited nature of exo-auto-reference; especially, human interpretation. Where phenomena are ecologically rooted and their complexity is recognized as necessary (rather then aberrant) the only viable analytic strategy is the 'approximate' identification of persistent qualities, adaptations and relationships: the structures, tendencies or constraints that indicate the likely direction of possibility.
Cognition and Adaptation
We are now in a position to consider the counterpart to the sort of constructivism exemplified by Maturana and Varela and its sociological variants. Now adaptation demands reconsideration, crucially, as a different form of 154 Theory, Culture & Society 22(5) constructivism. This is not a swing back to naturalism, though it might be thought of as a kind of neo-materialism following De Landa (1999) .
The older position is that complex effects (here complex adaptations) have complex causes. The principle of self-organization is quite different. Note that it applies at both macro and micro levels: for example, culture is self-organizing but so are the specific enactments of membership. The same is true for species and member, or for mind and specific consciousness. In each case differing degrees of freedom, feedback and mutual determination are at work. Whether in Darwin or Prigogine, and especially Cohen and Stewart (1995) , or in evolution theory, there are two fundamentals: origins have to be relatively simple and there must be a degree of chance. Complexity evolves, is the outcome of interaction and mutation. It is perhaps better to think in quasi-mathematical terms: due to the interaction of materials and chance, complexity arises out of there being a number of different possible outcomes or 'solutions' to the same state of affairs or 'equation'. The possible outcomes are 'non-linear'. Complexity does not require complex beginnings; on the contrary it demands simple origins that 'build' their own complexity through self-referential structural separations. This is Luhmann's position.
We now turn to the impact of this proposition on the theory of mind and consequently the theory of culture. For humanism, the mind has 'its own' complexity and its defining high point is human intelligence at its most plastic, exemplified in the use of language and the ability to 're-present': to imagine, evoke or symbolize that which is not itself present or 'pre-given'. Complexity theory in cognitive biology holds that both auto-organization and auto-eco-organization are the critical factors. Complexity, therefore, is an evolved characteristic overlaid on simpler beginnings; and it demonstrates a long history of adaptive viability at a variety of previous levels.
Humanism stresses both the unity and uniqueness of human consciousness. One would expect to see 20th-century post-humanism attempt to distance itself from that. However, much contemporary critical sociology continues to stress the uniqueness of humanity in the form of a dichotomy of the material and the social; or, by focusing on strictly selfreferential forms of productivity. Apart from Darwinist-influenced philosophy (Dennett, 1991 (Dennett, , 1995 (Dennett, , 2003 and clinical psychology (Damasio, 1994) , the major critiques in fact come from evolutionary psychology.
The major argument against the unity and uniqueness of the human mind and for its evolutionary development is that the brain is a complex of organs with widely distributed functions. Crucially, many of these are below the threshold of consciousness. Tooby and Cosmides (1992) seek to establish the psychological bases of culture. The work contains an extensive critique of what they call the 'standard social science model' (SSSM) reducible to two central propositions: (1) social reality is sui generic; and (2) an essential requirement for the member is the ability to 'learn' the culture. These are hardly controversial for sociology. From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, they are wrong.
Smith & Jenks -The Materiality of Information 155
Humans everywhere show striking patterns of local within-group similarity in their behaviour and though accompanied by profound intergroup differences. [Yet] . . . infants from all groups have essentially the same basic human design and potential. Human genetic variation, which is now directly detectable with modern electrophoretic techniques, is overwhelmingly sequestered into functionally superficial biochemical differences, leaving our complex functional design universal and species-typical. Also the bulk of the variation that does exist is overwhelmingly inter-individual and withinpopulation, and not between races or populations. (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992: 25, emphasis added) Their conclusion is surprising:
[Therefore] genetic [or racial] variation does not explain why human groups dramatically differ from one another in thought and behaviour. . . . [T] his is the only feature of the SSSM that is correct. (1992: 25) They continue:
Thus the central concept in psychology is learning. The prerequisite that a psychological theory must meet to participate in the SSSM is that any evolved component, process, or mechanism must be equipotential, content-free, content-independent, general purpose, domain-general. . . . [T] hese mechanisms must be constructed in such a way that they can absorb any kind of cultural message or environmental input equally well. (1992: 29) This, for Tooby and Cosmides, is the error. Where the SSSM requires what amounts to 'a blank slate', evolutionary psychology's model insists that 'completely plastic' learning is an evolutionary impossibility, 2 and that the relatively plastic nature of human learning rests on an entire series of adaptive mental capabilities or mechanisms. These structures are contentand function-specific.
A common example is the ability to learn a language. Without that, not only would the infant have to learn a language but also would have to 'learn how to learn'. Life time is too short, but evolutionary time makes it feasible. From that -crucially, from that unified antecedent -the huge variety of human language is possible. It also follows that linguistic variety cannot be infinite. If culture rests on similar multiple grounds, it too is massively varied but not unlimited. Stated then in the more general terms of complexity theory, content-specific mechanisms are both attracted and are themselves attractors. For example, the eye and corresponding visual systems have evolved independently and in a number of different forms in animal history (Mayr, 1982; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992) . The eye is recurrent because it confers advantages. Similarly the recurrence of functional eyes is itself an attractor: it organizes or influences its local environment in both the amount of brain structure dedicated to its mechanisms and to the amount of cultural resources dedicated to visual culture.
156 Theory, Culture & Society 22(5) For humanism, the mind is characterized by the unity of consciousness. For evolutionary psychology the brain is an organ, even a complex of organs ever more clearly exposed by neuro-biology's ability to map activity and structure. What follows from this is not the need for a detailed neuroanatomy, or a concept of restriction. Rather:
[C]ognitive psychology, evolutionary biology, artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, linguistics, and philosophy converge on the same conclusion: A psychological architecture that consisted of nothing but . . . general purpose . . . content-free mechanisms could not successfully perform the tasks the human mind is asked to perform. (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992: 34) And:
The central premise of an opposition between the mind as an inflexible biological product and the mind as a malleable social product is ill-informed: the notion that inherited psychological structure constrains is the notion that without it we would be even more flexible or malleable or environmentally responsive than we are. This is not only false but absurd. Without this evolved structure we would have no competences or contingent environmental responsiveness whatsoever. Evolved mechanisms do not prevent, constrain or limit the system from doing things it otherwise would do in their absence. . . . Evolved structure does not constrain; it creates or enables [an organized response to environmental inputs]. (1992: 38-9) Despite different reasoning, this is still close to Maturana and Varela's constructivism but with this emphasis:
[T]he behaviour of individual organisms is caused by the structure of their adaptations and the environmental input to them; it is not independently governed by fitness maximisation. Individual organisms are best thought of as adaptation-executors rather than as fitness-maximisers . . . (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992: 54) The article concludes with an address of 'the twilight of learning as a social science explanation'. This is certainly provocative. It also represents an important contribution to the complexity theory of mind:
[Human] minds do a host of singularly useful things. . . . they develop skill [s] . . . they change behaviour in impressively functional ways; they reconstruct themselves in knowledge derived from others. . . . Psychologists did not know what causal sequences brought these useful results about. They reified this unknown functionality imagining it to be a unitary process, and called it 'learning' . . . the unknown agent imagined to cause a large and heterogeneous set of functional outcomes. This name was (and is) then used as an explanation for results that remained in genuine need of explanation. . . . Under closer inspection 'learning' is turning out to be a diverse set of processes, caused by a series of incredibly intricate, functionally organised cognitive adaptations . . . (1992: 123) antecedents. In Tooby and Cosmides, 'noise' has a specific history of adaptation. The formalism of the phrase 'come to have dealings' is replaced by a substantive history which qualifies noise. Noise is directed or has evolved a history of significance: the noise (literally) of a baby's cry or an animal's growl is already meaningful to a degree. Noise is not simply noise, nor, therefore, are the boxes simply black. Negotiability and contingency have also evolved characteristics, however fluid. They too are 'attracted'. This implies that shades of 'grey-white' (functionally sufficient transparency) is the result of multiple pre and post-orderings, of which the mind may or may not be conscious. Plotkin writes:
It has become fashionable to decry the terms innate and instinct, especially amongst social scientists and especially when applied to our own species. This is nonsense. (2003: 52-3) This point is of overwhelming importance in our reading. He adds:
[A]daptive behaviours -instincts -wholly caused by a combination of genes and development do not in their enactment result in long term changes of central-nervous-system states. (2003: 52-3) The question is not that old, sterile chestnut of nature versus nurture, but the indication of an essential threshold -that of parallel processing: instinctual processes are necessary and therefore not transformative; the opposite is true of learned and modifiable behaviours. It would be an invitation to rapid extinction if either were to be infiltrated by the essential characteristics of the other. These systems of parallel processing, sometimes internetworked, at others necessarily 'insulated' are central to the most interesting critical positions in cognitive theory. 5 And their qualitative differences are swamped in the idea that most or all social phenomena are sui generic. Then Luhmann's description lacks complexity in this sense: terrestrial ecology is not order from noise but order from order and noise. This could be called 'structure' provided we grasp the dynamic complexity that must now accompany that term. 'Attractors' catch that sense better.
Despite concepts such as 'adaptation-enaction' no prescriptive determinism is implied because there are not enough bases in the human genome to specify the enormously greater number of possible connections in the human brain. Genetic determinism of the mind is therefore impossible: mind is 'emergent'. Crucially for complexity theory, what is missing in 'black boxes' and sui generic social phenomena is precisely that series of both antecedent and emerging attractors that makes 'humans' rather than black boxes or 'Martians'. The attractors that shape 'humanness' and 'human culture' are of a qualitatively different kind, but in constant interaction. Sociology, following complexity theory, should not feel threatened byindeed it needs -the qualitatively different attractors that might on the one hand ground 'a pan-human architecture' (with an emphasis on antecedents) or emergent attractors in the ecology of culture (with an emphasis on interactive possibility or 'plasticities'). Such a discipline would have to concede that its previously separated formalism (expressed as social phenomena are sui generic) is no longer tenable. The transition from a separate sociology of heterodoxy to a sociology of complexity demands an altogether more powerful and subtly nuanced relationship between sociology, generics, cognitive science and the multi-disciplinary study of self-organizing dynamics. This is a close parallel at the cognitive level to Urry's (2003: 138) 'dialectic of moorings and mobilities' at the level of global-glocal dynamics. However, we emphasize the qualitatively different modes of dynamic organizations that constitute such a dialectic. Here, our emphasis has been on the interplay of 'given' adaptation-enaction, and the post-natal plasticities of human intelligence, culture and its technologies. Operational closure, despite structural coupling, binds that dialectic to an emphasis on the inner matters of self-organization that resists or obscures external involvement. This is insupportably insular at either the biological level or, in Luhmann, at the social-systems level. What emerges instead (and incidentally concurs with how we, our cultures and our best technologies operate) is an operational but constantly redrafted, recursive or 'smeared' connectivity of inside-outside. To borrow Dennett's (2003) term, the self, we as members, our cultures and technologies are those recursive smears. 6 6. A great deal of extremely interesting work (as well as Luhmann's) is founded on operational closure. However it remains riddled by the problems of previous phenomenology where everything is 'constructed' by cognitive processes. See for example Petito et al. (1999) or Lakoff and Núñez (2000) .
